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M
odern medicine can extend life to an extent that a
patient dying of a terminal illness may feel trapped.
Suffering can become unbearable. Some patients
want to obtain medication from their doctor that they could
ingest to achieve a peaceful death, an option known as aid in
dying.
However, a lack of clarity in New Zealand law presents an
obstacle to dying patients who wish to obtain such assistance
in this country. Under the Crimes Act 1961, s 179:
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing 14 years who—
(a) incites, counsels, or procures any person to commit
suicide, if that person commits or attempts to com-
mit suicide in consequence thereof; or
(b) aids or abets any person in the commission of
suicide.
A doctor who respects a competent, terminally ill patient’s
right to make end of life choices and provides aid in dying
thus risks prosecution and conviction if the patient’s act to
achieve a peaceful death is considered “suicide” (see, for
example R v Mott [2012] NZHC 2366; R v Davison [2011]
NZHC 1677). The lack of clarity in the law creates an
uncertain legal environment making it very difficult for com-
petent, terminally ill persons to die as they prefer: peacefully,
on their own terms, with help from a medical professional,
avoiding the final cruel bit of suffering caused by their illness.
A significant majority of New Zealanders support empow-
ering patients suffering from terminal illnesses or unbearable
pain to have access to aid in dying, with polls ranging from
60–82% approval. Reports of such strong public support for
this compassionate option have been consistent for some
fifteen years.
Unfortunately, public support for providing a clear legal
path for patients wishing to access aid in dying has not
translated into parliamentary action. On two occasions, in
1995 and 2003, members’ bills designed to permit “Death
With Dignity” were defeated on their first readings. More
recently, the Labour MP Ian Lees-Galloway was pressured
into withdrawing the End of Life Choice Bill from the mem-
bers’ ballot. And while Prime Minister John Key has expressed
his personal support for permitting aid in dying, there appear
to be no government moves to introduce legislation permit-
ting it.
The result is that there are no legislative vehicles currently
available to deliver New Zealanders the legal clarity they
appear to want. It is in this vacuum that Lecretia Seales, a
woman suffering from a terminal form of brain cancer, has
asked the High Court for a declaratory judgment to the effect
that it is not an offence under s 179 for a doctor to provide
her with aid in dying (Seales v Attorney General [2015]
NZHC 828).
While the authors have provided Ms Seales’ counsel with
some general advice, we have not seen the pleadings in her
case. As such, we do not know precisely how the matter has
been presented to the Court. Our purpose in this article is to
review how such cases have been litigated in the United
States, before outlining how a similar approach may be
argued in New Zealand.
AID IN DYING IN THE UNITED STATES
There is, as yet, no constitutionally recognised “right to die”
in the United States under its Constitution. When invited to
find that liberty and equality guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution protects the right of an
individual to choose aid in dying, the Supreme Court of the
United States declined to find a federal constitutional right at
the time. However, it carefully reserved the possibility it
might do so in future and invited the “laboratory of the
States” to grapple with the issue in the meantime (Vacco
v Quill 521 US 793, 797–99 (1997); Washington v Glucksberg
521 US 702, 707–09 (1997)). The benefit of such an approach
in a nation comprised of fifty states is that one or more states
can address the matter while the others can watch and learn
from their experience.
The “laboratory” opened in Oregon shortly after the
Supreme Court’s decision, with implementation of Oregon’s
voter approved Death with Dignity Act, which permits aid in
dying. Oregon law requires doctors providing aid in dying to
collect and report a vast amount of data about the patients
who request it to the Oregon Health Authority, which pub-
lishes an annual statistical report presenting this informa-
tion. This substantial body of data allows us to evaluate the
impact of an open practice of aid in dying upon both patients
and medical practice.
Concerns about whether an open practice of aid in dying
would harm patients, vulnerable populations, or the delivery
of medical care to dying patients – the main reason for the
opposition to a “right to die” before the United States
Supreme Court – have been put to rest by the experience in
Oregon, and more recently a number of other states. Despite
the speculation and conjecture of those opposed to aid in
dying, none of the dire predictions of harm raised by oppo-
nents have been realised.
Indeed, the passage of the Death with Dignity Act led to a
greater effort by physicians and hospice care professionals to
ensure adequate pain and symptom management (Schneider-
man “Physician-Assisted Dying” (2005) 293 J Am Med Assn
501). Once aid in dying becomes openly available, experi-
ence shows that physicians work harder to improve end-of-
life care, improve their knowledge of pain and symptom
management, and their ability to recognise depression and
other psychiatric disorders. Referrals to hospice care increase
and are often made earlier in the course of the patient’s
illness.
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Since Oregon’s initial move, Washington and Vermont
have joined it in enacting legislation that permits aid in dying:
the “laboratory of the States” has served its intended pur-
pose.
EXPANDING END OF LIFE CHOICE THROUGH
U.S. COURTS
In the United States, the Federal Constitution sets a floor for
the rights of citizens; the states may choose to confer more
protections to citizens within their borders through state
constitutions. Many states have done so. This opens another
avenue for advocates seeking to expand end of life choice:
litigation in state courts, typically raising both statutory and
state constitutional claims.
Montana provided the first success for this strategy. Rob-
ert Baxter, a seventy-five year-old former U.S. Marine dying
of lymphocytic leukemia, and a number of doctors sued the
State of Montana to establish the right of a competent,
terminally ill citizen to choose aid in dying (Baxter v. State
224 P3d 1211 (Mont 2009)). The challenge was run on two
grounds. First, this choice is worthy of protection under the
Montana State Constitution’s explicit guarantees of privacy
and dignity (this was the basis of a lower court ruling in the
plaintiff’s favour). Alternatively, doctors who provide aid in
dying could not be subject to prosecution, because the patient
seeking aid in dying would have consented to the conduct
that resulted in death and such a death would not conflict
with public policy. In other words, physicians were not
within reach of the state’s criminal prohibition of aiding
another person to precipitate their death.
The Montana Supreme Court declined to decide the con-
stitutional issues, choosing to resolve the case on the alterna-
tive, statutoryground. Itheld thatMontana’s statuteempowering
citizens with the ability to direct medical care through an
advance directive reflects the policy of the state to vest
patients with broad autonomy over medical decision mak-
ing. Since the state had expressed such policy, a decision of a
competent patient for aid in dying was not against public
policy, and thus the “consent” of the patient to the doctor’s
provision of aid in dying precluded prosecution (Baxter at
1215).
Under this ruling, doctors may provide aid in dying to
mentally competent, terminally ill patients without fear of
prosecution. Montana doctors are not subject to the statu-
tory frameworks established in states with legislation gov-
erning the practice. However, the Montana Supreme Court
recognised certain boundaries which are similar to some of
the statutory limits in states with permissive legislation: the
patient must be terminally ill, mentally competent, and the
doctor is limited to providing a prescription for medication
which a patient may ingest to achieve a peaceful death
(Baxter at 1217). In Montana, beyond the bounds set by
Baxter, the practice of aid in dying is developing subject to
the medical profession’s own best practices. This is as it
should be: medicine is not commonly governed by statute,
but rather by evolving practices which physicians refine as
they learn from treating patients. The “best practices” become
adopted by practicing physicians. This evolution of best
practices is an organic process, quite different from the rigid
structure of a statutory scheme.
Following the success in Montana, similar cases were
brought in New Mexico (Morris v New Mexico No D-202-CV
2012-02909 slip op (NM Dist Ct Jan 13, 2014) (appeal
argued 1/26/15)), New York (Myers et al v Schneiderman et
al Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New
York No 151162/15 (filed 2/4/15)), and California (Brody et
al v Harris et al, Superior Court of the State of California
City and County of San Francisco No CGC-15-544086 (filed
2/11/15)) raising statutory and state constitutional claims to
establish access to aid in dying. The focus of this article is on
the statutory scope argument, as that sort of claim could
open access to aid in dying in New Zealand, as discussed
below. The cases are brought by terminally ill patients with
cancer, motor neuron disease and AIDS, and doctors who
provide care to patients with such conditions.
These cases assert that decades old (New Mexico’s law is
50 years old, California’s 140 years old and New York’s
more than 200 years old) legislative enactments criminalising
“assisting suicide” say nothing in the text or legislative
history about a doctor providing care to dying patients
seeking a peaceful death, and so do not reach the conduct of
a doctor providing aid in dying. Indeed, when these statutes
were enacted medicine was not as advanced as it is today.
Death typically came swiftly; where an extremely protracted
dying process once was rare, now it is common (see A
Gawande Being Mortal: Medicine and What Matters in the
End (Metropolitan Books, New York, 2014)).
The plaintiffs in these cases accept that the challenged
statutes have a proper application and scope; for example, to
prohibit someone from handing a lovesick teenager a gun
when the teen, distraught over the ending of a romantic
relationship, declares life is no longer worth living (this fact
pattern was presented in People v. Duffy 79 NY 2d 611
(1992)). However, the plaintiffs argue that the choice by a
dying patient of a peaceful death is fundamentally and starkly
different from such situations, urging the courts to recognise
as much and hold that should the state desire to outlaw this
choice it must do so with more specific language. This has
been done in a number of states, including, for example,
Arkansas (Ark Code Ann, s 5-10-106 (making illegal the act
of a “physician … wilfully prescribing any drug, compound,
or substance for the express purpose of assisting a patient to
intentionally end the patient’s life”)).
In these cases, plaintiffs are aided by the fact that mental
health professionals, including the national and some state
psychological associations, have recognised that suicide and
aid in dying are fundamentally different and ought not to be
conflated. For example, the New Mexico Psychological Asso-
ciation filed an amicus brief in Morris, discussing the critical
difference between suicide and aid in dying and urging the
court to find that the New Mexico statute prohibiting assist-
ing suicide does not reach the conduct of a physician provid-
ing aid in dying. This brief cites a statement adopted by the
American Psychological Association (Brief of Amicus Curiae
Coalition of Mental Health Professionals at 17, Gonzales
v Oregon, 126 S Ct 904 (2006) (No 04-623):
It is important to remember that the reasoning on which a
terminally ill person (whose judgments are not impaired
by mental disorders) bases a decision to end his or her life
is fundamentally different from the reasoning a clinically
depressed person uses to justify suicide.
ARGUING THE MATTER IN THE NEW ZEALAND
COURTS
Ms Seales’ application for a declaratory judgment makes
much the same statutory scope argument that has been
advanced in the United States. Her case turns upon the
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proper understanding of the Crimes Act 1961, s 179. It states
that anyone who “incites, counsels, or procures any person
to commit suicide”, or “aids or abets any person in the
commission of suicide”, commits a criminal offence. Whether
those provisions cover the case of a doctor who supplies
Ms Seales with aid in dying is the question. This is a matter of
statutory interpretation. Key to that process is the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), s 6:
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is
consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this
Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other
meaning.
To simplify, s 6 requires a two-step approach (R v Hansen
[2007] NZSC 7; Paul Rishworth “Human Rights” [2012]
NZ L Rev 321 at 330–331). First, does an “ordinary” or
“plain meaning” interpretation of s 179 that criminalises the
conduct of a doctor who assists a competent, terminally ill
patient to achieve a peaceful death via aid in dying unjustifi-
ably limit any of the rights and freedoms contained in the
NZBORA? If so, can the word “suicide” in s 179 be given an
alternative meaning that is consistent with the NZBORA?
We need not spend too much time on the first point, as a
recent unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada,
Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] SCC 5, provides
extremely strong persuasive authority that it does so. It
found that (at [57]):
The right to life is engaged where the law or state action
imposes death or an increased risk of death on a person,
either directly or indirectly. Here, the prohibition deprives
some individuals of life, as it has the effect of forcing some
individuals to take their own lives prematurely, for fear
that they would be incapable of doing so when they
reached the point where suffering was intolerable.
Consequently, the Canadian criminal law’s blanket prohibi-
tion on aiding suicide (which the parties in Carter assumed,
for the purposes of the case, reached the act of doctor
providing aid in dying) limits an individual’s right to life
guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, s 7.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that this limit is
not consistent with the s 7 requirement that a person only
may be deprived of their right to life in ways that are
“consistent with the principles of fundamental justice”. A
ban on aid in dying imposes a limit that is overly broad
(Carter at [86]):
… the limitation on … rights is in at least some cases not
connected to the objective of protecting vulnerable per-
sons. The blanket prohibition sweeps conduct into its
ambit that is unrelated to the law’s objective.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court cited the
extensive evidence reviewed by the trial court from jurisdic-
tions around the world which permit physician assisted
dying (Carter at [104]). In particular, drawing on the signifi-
cant body of empirical data that has emerged from the
Oregon “state laboratory”, the trial court found that when
assisted dying is available there is no evidence of harm to
patients or to vulnerable populations (Carter at [25]).
Consequently, the Supreme Court found that Canada’s
effective prohibition on aid in dying breaches the Canadian
Charter, rendering the law invalid to the extent it prohibits a
doctor providing a means of a peaceful death to a competent
adult who (at [127]):
(1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a
grievous and irremediable medical condition (including
an illness, disease, or disability) that causes enduring
physical or psychological suffering that is intolerable to
the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition.
It then stayed this finding for twelve months to permit the
federal Parliament to enact reasonable safeguards, should it
opt to do so.
Although the Canadian Charter’s “supreme law” status
ultimately was rejected in New Zealand, it still provides the
model for our NZBORA. Unsurprisingly, therefore, s 8 of the
NZBORA guarantees each individual’s right to life in terms
virtually identical to the Canadian Charter. Furthermore, as
Ms Seales’ husband notes, the same issue of premature death
arises here in New Zealand (<www.lecretia.org/on-suicide/
>):
What Lecretia faces are the horns of a dilemma: kill
herself now and rob herself, me and her family of precious
moments together, or risk waiting until death takes her,
which could be weeks or months of needless, potentially
agonising suffering.
THE MEANING OF “SUICIDE”
Consequently, it seems almost certain that a New Zealand
court, considering the Carter v Canada precedent, would
find that a reading of s 179 that prevents Ms Seales access to
aid in dying is inconsistent with the NZBORA (see also
Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice And Correctional Ser-
vices and Others (27401/15) [2015] ZAGPPHC 230). That
leads to the second required step under s 6: is the word
“suicide” in s 179 able to be given an alternative meaning
that is consistent with the NZBORA? For where such a
meaning can be given, then the Court shall prefer it.
This alternative meaning would distinguish between the
sorts of intentional self-inflicted deaths we ordinarily think
of as being “suicide” (the lovesick teen, the family breadwin-
ner facing financial crisis, and so forth) and the act of a
competent, terminally ill person who is seeking (as in Ms Seales’
case) to choose a more peaceful death when brought to
death’s door by the advance of disease and enduring unbear-
able suffering. Are these scenarios distinguishable from each
other, and can that distinction be given effect under the
specific wording of the Crimes Act?
Here the evidence proffered in the United States context
seems very relevant. The fact that mental health profession-
als, including state psychological associations, have recognised
that suicide and aid in dying are fundamentally different and
ought not be conflated should make us realise that focusing
on the similar outcome when considering whether a compe-
tent, terminally ill patient who acts to precipitate a peaceful
death is committing “suicide” is to completely misunder-
stand what is going on. They are two quite different phenom-
ena, undertaken for different reasons and under different
circumstances.
That leads to the next issue. Even if terminally ill patients
choosing a more peaceful death are engaging in an act that is
different in nature to what we ordinarily consider to be
suicide, can the word “suicide” in the Crimes Act be read in
a way that excludes them?
We may start by asking why exactly Parliament made it a
crime to incite, procure, counsel, aid or abet “suicide”.
Originally, it was because taking one’s own life itself was
viewed as an unforgivable sin — up until 1961 it was a crime
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in itself to attempt suicide — and so facilitating anyone to do
so was just as unforgivable. However, societal views have
since shifted, in that we no longer regard trying to deliber-
ately end your own life as being so morally abhorrent that it
is of itself deserving of criminal sanction.
Consequently, criminalising actions that contribute to
another’s suicide now must reflect a desire to protect those
who are deeply vulnerable and so prone to take a deeply
misguided action that cannot then be undone (see Carter
v Canada at [29]). If you do something to facilitate such a
self-inflicted death, then you are committing a wrong that the
State should sanction you for because you have contributed
to another’s irretrievable action that no properly thinking
person would want to undertake.
But, of course, those wishing to access aid in dying are not
vulnerable in this way. Choosing to suffer less before death
arrives can be an entirely rational response to a horrific
situation that cannot be remedied. No matter how fervently
they may wish to live, their illness has robbed them of that
option. The only question is how much suffering will be
endured before death arrives. Suffering can be multifactorial,
and indeed the experience in jurisdictions where aid in dying
is openly available demonstrates this: those who choose aid
in dying typically express that they do so because of the
cumulative burden their illness imposes. These burdens may
include: loss of ability to engage in activities which give life
joy and meaning; progressive and inexorable loss of bodily
function and integrity; increasing dependence on others for
all personal care needs; pain that cannot be relieved; extreme
fatigue; severe nausea and vomiting; acute shortness of breath
and sensation of suffocation; open wounds with foul-
smelling discharge.
Choosing a less brutal death ought not to be considered
suicide. Indeed, acting to precipitate impending death and
avoid further suffering may be a kind of preservation of the
self, a way to allow the last bit of life to involve an exercise of
autonomy, which for some is crucially important to their
sense of self, and coherent with the life lived. As Ronald
Dworkin eloquently states (Life’s Dominion (Knopf, New
York, 1993) at 199):
We live our whole lives in the shadow of death, we die in
the shadow of our whole lives. … [W]e worry about the
effect of life’s last stage on the character of life as a whole,
as we might worry about the effect of a play’s last scene or
a poem’s last stanza on the entire creative work.
Therefore, interpreting “suicide” in s 179 as excluding the
act of competent, terminally ill patients, like Ms Seales, who
wish to achieve a peaceful death when disease has brought
them to death’s door, is consistent with Parliament’s purpose
of preventing individuals from intentionally cutting short an
otherwise viable life. Furthermore, a reading of “suicide”
that excludes Ms Seales’ situation better fits the rest of the
Crimes Act 1961 than does one that encompasses it. Con-
sider s 41:
Every one is justified in using such force as may be
reasonably necessary in order to prevent the commission
of suicide … or in order to prevent any act being done
which he or she believes, on reasonable grounds, would, if
committed, amount to suicide or to any such offence.
Imagine that someone like Ms Seales were to publicly announce
that in light of the advance of incurable brain cancer she is
going to ingest medication at a particular time, on a particu-
lar day, in her bed at home while surrounded by her loved
ones, in order to achieve a peaceful death and avoid further
horrific suffering. Should everyone in New Zealand then be
permitted to “us[e] such force as may reasonably be neces-
sary” to stop her from doing so? If her choice were to be
deemed “suicide” under the Crimes Act, then apparently
they can.
Or, consider s 180, which criminalises “suicide pacts”.
Imagine a situation where a couple both find themselves
facing some terminal condition and decide that, rather than
drift slowly to the end of their diseases, they wish to end their
time together while they can recognise and appreciate each
other. So they lie down on a bed together with their favourite
music playing and each take an assumedly fatal dose of drugs
— but it fails to end the life of one of them.
Should the survivor be considered guilty of a criminal
offence under s 180(2), such that he or she could be impris-
oned for up to five years? If you treat the couple’s joint choice
as being a “suicide” under the Crimes Act, then he or she is.
A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE MEANING?
In the context of the Crimes Act, an alternative meaning for
“suicide” that does not encompass those in Ms Seales’ situ-
ation, more effectively fits the text and purpose of the legis-
lation (Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1)). Would a court then
be prepared to adopt it? They already have been called on to
consider what kinds of intentional taking of one’s own life
constitute a suicide. In the case of Chief Executive of Depart-
ment of Corrections v All Means All [2014] NZHC 1433, the
High Court was asked whether prison officials and health
authorities had any legal power to force-feed a prisoner who
was threatening to starve himself to death as a form of
protest. Justice Pankhurst found they did not, as the prison-
er’s decision to (potentially) end his own life should not be
equated with suicide (at [44], emphasis added):
His intention is to bring pressure to bear on the person
who he believes is guilty of misconduct. Death is an
unwanted end result of the means Mr All Means All has
adopted, but it is certainly not his desire, nor his intention.
Accordingly, the High Court already has recognised that not
all cases of conduct that result in one’s own death are to be
treated as “suicide”. It also distinguished Mr All Means All’s
decision to (potentially) end his life on grounds similar to
those argued by individuals seeking aid in dying. They, too,
do not “desire” or “intend” death qua death; given the
choice between a pill that cures them of their terminal
condition or aid in dying, the former is what they really want.
However, their imminent death is a fact that they now cannot
avoid, leaving them with only the possibility of some element
of control over the circumstances in which that inescapable
event takes place. Their intention is not to die, but to control
how they die.
Furthermore, the Courts have performed similar interpre-
tative moves in other legislative contexts. In the case of Re
AMM & KJO [2010] NZHC 977, the High Court accepted
that the word “spouse” in the Adoption Act 1955 could be
read to include “an unmarried couple in a long term de facto
relationship”. Even though the Parliament that enacted the
legislation clearly would not have intended the word to cover
such persons, the Court was prepared to adopt a NZBORA
consistent interpretation because (at [50]):
Continued on page 202
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Continued from page 175
Although not the meaning that was intended at the time of
enactment, it is a meaning that is consistent with the
purposes of the Act, is not a strained meaning of “spouse”,
and is workable within the other parts of the Act. It will
havequite limitedconsequencesbeyond theareaof adoption.
Change the word “spouse” to “suicide” and the word “adop-
tion” to “aid in dying” and it seems entirely reasonable for a
court to reach the same conclusion in Ms Seales’ case.
One last hurdle remains, however. Under New Zealand
law, a court’s decision whether to grant the declaration is
purely discretionary (Declaratory Judgments Act 1908, s 10).
Courts have been reluctant to grant such declarations as to
whether or not certain conduct amounts (or will amount) to
the commission of a criminal office (see Imperial Tobacco
v Attorney-General [1981] AC 718 (HL); Ambrose v Attorney-
General HC AK CIV 2011-404-7392 23, November 2011).
Doing so, the courts fear, “risks usurping the function of the
criminal court (including the function of a Judge or a jury to
find the facts)” (Ambrose at [36]).
However, this reluctance is not the same as a jurisdictional
bar (Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993]
1 NZLR 235 (HC); R v Sloan [1990] 1 NZLR 474 (HC)).
The courts have, on occasion, given such declarations as to
the legal rights and duties of individuals under criminal
statutes where there is no factual dispute at issue. In particu-
lar, the courts have been quite prepared to make declarations
regarding the legal responsibility of health providers to pro-
vide treatment (see, for example Hutt District Health Board
v B [2011] NZFLR 873; All Means All at [70]–[71]). There
seems no reason, therefore, that a court should not make a
declaration as to whether a doctor who provides Ms Seales,
or another mentally competent terminally ill patient, with
the means of precipitating a peaceful death (if she so chooses)
runs afoul of s 179.
WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
There are those who will argue, no doubt, that this is no place
for the courts and that it should be left to Parliament to
address matters in this arena.
Two points may be made about this claim. First of all, this
is the courts’ business in that Parliament has specifically
given it the task of interpreting and applying laws in ways
thatareconsistentwith the individual rightsunder theNZBORA.
Using that interpretative power to clarify the scope of the
challenged law is a perfectly respectable judicial function,
authorised by Parliament; indeed it is a quintessential judicial
duty and responsibility.
Second, a declaration that s 179 of the Crimes Act does
not cover aid in dying does not necessarily end the matter. If
Parliament really thinks that aid in dying ought to be a crime,
then it can respond by amending the Crimes Act to make it
clear that a doctor providing aid in dying is a criminal. Of
course, were it to do so, Parliament would be doing some-
thing in conflict with the views of the great majority of
New Zealanders. But if it really wants to do it, it can.
Consequently, we believe that there is a very strong case
for recognising that existing law does not reach the conduct
of a physician providing a mentally competent terminally ill
patient in New Zealand with means to achieve a peaceful
death. We hope for Ms Seales’ sake, and that of others who
find themselves in her position, that we are correct. Now we
wait to see if Collins J agrees with us in the High Court. ❒
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